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TRYING TO FIT A SQUARE PEG INTO A ROUND HOLE:
WHY TITLE II OF THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT MUST APPLY TO ALL LAW
ENFORCEMENT SERVICES
Michael Pecorini
Police use of force has been subject to greater scrutiny in recent
years in the wake of several high-profile killings of African
Americans. Less attention, however, has been paid to the
increasingly routine violent encounters between police and
individuals with mental illness or intellectual and development
disabilities (“I/DD”). This is particularly problematic, as police
have become the de-facto first responders to these individuals and
far too often police responses to these individuals result in tragedy.
This Note argues that the Americans with Disabilities Act
requires law enforcement to provide reasonable accommodations
during their interactions with and seizures of individuals with
mental illness or I/DD. Arrest should not be the default option. Nor
should police resort to using force when less confrontational tactics
exist. When reviewing the use of force during these encounters,
courts should grant less automatic deference to police split-second
decision making and instead consider the totality of the
circumstances, including whether and to what extent police
provided reasonable accommodations, and whether such
accommodations would have mitigated the risk necessitating the use
of force.
While there are an increasing number of programs throughout
the country dedicated to improving police responses to individuals
with mental illness and I/DD, more fervent efforts must be
undertaken to help officers peacefully resolve these situations and
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avoid unnecessary arrests and violent confrontations. More tailored
police training, such as crisis intervention training, is crucial in this
regard. Finally, this Note examines the increased criminalization of
individuals with mental illness and I/DD and identifies
comprehensive reasonable accommodations that should be
implemented, such as judicial reform and progressive identification
tools, to better protect these individuals against undue
discrimination in the criminal justice system.
INTRODUCTION
Milton Hall.1 James Boyd.2 Kajieme Powell.3 Kristiana
Coignard.4 Gary Page.5 These are the names of victims of fatal
police shootings who all shared a common trait—they all exhibited
signs of mental illness and/or intellectual and developmental
disabilities (“I/DD”). Teresa Sheehan’s name might also have been
included on this list. Though she survived, Sheehan was tragically
shot numerous times by police who were called to help transport her
for mental health treatment.6 Unfortunately, Sheehan’s case is not
1

See Lauren Walker, Two Years Later, No Charges After Police Kill
Homeless Man in Barrage of 46 Shots, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 28, 2014),
http://www.newsweek.com/two-years-later-no-charges-after-police-killhomeless-man-barrage-46-shots-280609.
2
See Fernanda Santos & Erica Goode, Police Confront Rising Number of
Mentally
Ill
Suspects,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
1,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/02/us/police-shootings-of-mentally-illsuspects-are-on-the-upswing.html?_r=2.
3
See Conor Friedersdorf, The Killing of Kajieme Powell and How it Divides
Americans,
ATLANTIC
(Aug.
21,
2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/08/the-killing-of-kajiemepowell/378899/.
4
See David M. Perry, Opinion, When Police Deal with People in Crisis,
CNN
(last
updated
Feb.
3,
2015,
10:06
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/03/opinion/perry-mental-illness-police/.
5
See Wesley Lowery et al., Distraught People, Deadly Results, WASH. POST
(June 30, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/06/30/distraughtpeople-deadly-results/.
6
See Nadja Popovich, Police Shooting of Mentally Ill Woman Reaches US
Supreme Court. Why Did it Happen at All?, GUARDIAN (Mar. 23, 2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/mar/23/police-shooting-mentally-illteresa-sheehan-supreme-court.
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uncommon. These victims are indicative of an increasingly common
problem in America, one that transcends traditional demographics.7
Persons with mental illnesses and I/DD are disproportionately
affected by violent use of police force; and, though efforts have been
undertaken to alleviate this problem, it nonetheless is still prevalent,
and may in fact be getting worse.8
A 2015 Washington Post report highlighted damning statistics
indicating the frequency of deadly police shootings of persons with
mental illness, I/DD, and emotional disturbances.9 Albeit itself
incredibly disconcerting, the picture becomes even bleaker when
accounting for the nonfatal, yet still violent, confrontations between
law enforcement and people with disabilities such as Teresa
Sheehan.10 These statistics underscore an important issue— as these
police encounters become increasingly routine—that of determining
and implementing appropriate procedures for interacting with and
accommodating people with I/DD or other mental health issues to
avoid unnecessary arrests and increasingly violent confrontations.
In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed this contentious issue
but declined to affirmatively settle the question and adopt a clear
standard for the lower courts to follow.11 The Court granted
certiorari on a Ninth Circuit case, Sheehan v. City & County of San
7

Perry, supra note 4 (“[T]he ongoing crisis of violent police encounters with
people with mental health transcends race, class and gender.”).
8
See generally Santos & Goode, supra note 2.
9
At the time the report was published, in June 2015, The Washington Post
reported that, “[n]ationwide, police have shot and killed 124 people this year
who . . . were in the throes of mental or emotional crises . . . . The dead account
for a quarter of the 462 people shot to death by police in the first six months of
2015.” Lowery et al., supra note 5. These statistics have roughly remained
consistent throughout 2015 and 2016. As of this submission, the compiled
statistics indicate that out of a combined 1,834 people shot and killed by police,
449 exhibited signs of mental illness. See THE WASH. POST, 843 People Shot Dead
By Police This Year, 991 People Were Fatally Shot By Police in 2015,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/police-shootings/
(last
visited Nov. 18, 2016).
10
See, e.g., Sandra Allen, The Trials of Teresa Sheehan, BUZZFEED (July 9,
2015, 11:39 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/sandraeallen/the-trials-of-teresasheehan-how-america-is-killing-its-ment#.pvbweE2rwp.
11
See City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774
(2015).
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Francisco,12 “to consider two questions relating to the manner in
which San Francisco police officers arrested a woman who was
suffering from a mental illness and had become violent.”13
However, the Court declined to decide the significant question14 of
whether, and to what extent, law enforcement officers are required
to provide reasonable accommodations in their seizures of suspects
with mental illness.15 The Court’s silence has important legal
implications as the circuit courts have reached conflicting decisions
on this matter.16 Besides the lack of a national, uniform criminal
procedure, the Supreme Court’s continued silence on this issue also
raises the specter of unequal protection for persons with mental
illness and I/DD, with varying levels of protection in place merely
based on jurisdictional or geographical differences.17
This Note argues that to prevent inconsistent law enforcement,
and to further protect individuals with I/DD and mental illnesses, the
Supreme Court should analyze these police encounters using a
totality of the circumstances standard. The Court should further hold
12

Sheehan v. City and County of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir.
2014), rev’d in part, cert dismissed in part, (135 S. Ct. 1765) (2015).
13
Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1769. However, the Court only decided one of those
questions – whether the San Francisco police officers could be held personally
liable for the injuries that Sheehan suffered as a result of her police encounter,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id. at 1774. The Court held that the officers
were entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 1778. A discussion of this issue is
beyond the scope of this Note.
14
See Allen, supra note 10 (describing the question of whether police
officers are required to accommodate suspects with disabilities as one with
“tremendous stakes”).
15
The Court dismissed the question as improvidently granted. Sheehan, 135
S. Ct. at 1774.
16
See infra Part III.
17
See Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to
Integration, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 393, 418 (1991) (“In passing the ADA, Congress
exercised its power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to enforce the
Equal Protection Clause of that amendment.”); Michael L. Perlin, “For the
Misdemeanor Outlaw”: The Impact of the ADA on the Institutionalization of
Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 193, 220 (2000)
(“[A]ny violation of the ADA must be read in the same light as a violation of the
Equal Protection clause of the Constitution.”). See generally Wayne A. Logan,
Constitutional Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and the Fourth Amendment, 65
VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1138–39 (2012).
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that suspects with I/DD and other mental illnesses are entitled to
presumptive reasonable accommodations under the American with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), which are rebuttable under certain,
limited exceptions. In addition, this Note examines policies and
procedures that should be implemented to provide more proactive
accommodations throughout the criminal justice system, especially
during high-stakes situations such as arrests.18 As the disconcerting
statistics indicating the prevalence of violent confrontations
between law enforcement and the mentally ill prove,19 there is a
legitimate need for law enforcement agencies to implement more
accommodating services and policies wherever feasible to
ameliorate this problem and ensure that persons with mental illness
or I/DD are treated justly.
Part I of this Note argues why the ADA applies to arrests and
other related law enforcement services. This part analyzes the text
of the ADA and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) regulations that
have been promulgated to guide the enforcement of its provisions.
Part II outlines the facts and procedure of Sheehan as well as the
legal implications of the Supreme Court’s holding. Part III
highlights the circuit split on this issue and examines the relevant
standards adopted by the circuits. Part IV focuses on additional
justifications for why the ADA applies to law enforcement
procedures and surveys the increased criminalization of mental
illness and I/DD. This part identifies policy justifications in support
of this assertion, including a brief look at how disability is treated
elsewhere in the criminal justice system, and emphasizes that the
ADA’s reasonable accommodations requirement is consistent with
the Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Finally, Part V discusses best practices and
accommodations that should be universally adopted to provide more
comprehensive protections for people with mental illness and I/DD
18

This note is cognizant of the fact that often officers’ lives are also at risk
during these encounters and recognizes the legitimate state interests in protecting
public safety. Therefore, it is important to note that none of the proposed policies
discussed in this Note are “anti-police.” These policy suggestions are offered with
the hope of fostering cooperation and understanding on both sides of the law, with
the ultimate goal of avoiding unnecessary arrests and violent confrontations
between people with I/DD or other mental health related issues and the police.
19
See, e.g., Lowery et al., supra note 5.
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in their interactions with law enforcement and the criminal justice
system.
I. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT: WHY THE ADA APPLIES TO ARRESTS20
Arlene Mayerson, the Disability Rights Education and Defense
Fund’s Directing Attorney, in a piece explaining the history of the
ADA, neatly identified why the ADA is such an important piece of
legislation: “If the ADA means anything, it means that people with
disabilities will no longer be out of sight and out of mind . . . .
Accommodating a person with a disability is no longer a matter of
charity but instead a basic issue of civil rights.”21
The ADA is a comprehensive antidiscrimination statute
designed to safeguard equal opportunity and full participation for
persons with disabilities.22 Congress clearly intended a broad
remedial scope for the ADA “to provide a clear and comprehensive
20

This note focuses specifically on Title II of the ADA and the obligations
it places on public entities, however the ADA is a much broader antidiscrimination statute. The ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability
in the areas of employment, public accommodations, transportation, and
telecommunications. A GUIDE TO DISABILITY RIGHTS LAWS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.
(July 2009), https://www.ada.gov/cguide.htm. Title II specifically applies to State
and Local governments and the services and agencies operated therein. See 42
U.S.C. § 12132 (1990). Title I of the ADA is specifically designated for
employment practices. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2008). Title III is specifically
designated to cover public accommodations and services operated by private
entities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (1990). Title IV of the ADA applies to common
carriers and telecommunications services. See 47 U.S.C. § 225 (2010); see also
Title IV of the ADA, https://www.fcc.gov/general/title-iv-ada (last visited Sept. 16,
2016). Finally, Title V of the ADA covers miscellaneous provisions that do not
fit neatly into these categories. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201–12213 (2009).
21
Arlene Mayerson, The History of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
DISABILITY
RTS.
EDUC.
&
DEF.
FUND
(1992),
http://dredf.org/news/publications/the-history-of-the-ada/.
22
See SOUTHEAST ADA CTR., ADA NAT’L NETWORK, ADA ANNIVERSARY
TOOL KIT 1, http://adaanniversary.org/2015/ada_findings_history_2015_adatoolkit.pdf
(last visited Sept. 16, 2016). The ADA has a simple yet direct message, that
“millions of Americans with disabilities are full-fledged citizens and as such are
entitled to legal protections that ensure them equal opportunity and access to the
mainstream of American life.” Id. at 2.
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national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities”23 and “to provide clear, strong,
consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against
individuals with disabilities.”24 Congress further expressed their
intent “to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate
commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination
faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.”25 Moreover, in
providing a rule of construction for defining “disability,” Congress
mandated that “disability in this chapter shall be construed in favor
of broad coverage of individuals under this chapter, to the maximum
extent permitted by the terms of [the ADA].”26 Thus, the ADA’s
express statutory language points in a single direction—towards the
broad application and interpretation of its provisions.
The ADA further provides an expansive definition of
discrimination. Title II of the ADA, which sets forth broad
prohibitions against discrimination, mandates that “no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity.”27 The ADA broadly defines
“public entity” to include “any State or local government; [and] any
department, agency, special purpose district, or other
instrumentality of a State or States or local government.”28 The
majority of courts have consistently affirmed a broad reading of
23

42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2009).
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2).
25
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4).
26
42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(a) (2009).
27
42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1990). The Americans with Disabilities Act Title II
regulations provide a similar mandate—public entities are prohibited from
“deny[ing] a qualified individual with a disability the opportunity to participate in
or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(i) (2011).
Title III of the ADA broadly defines discrimination to include “a failure to take
such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is
excluded, denied services, segregated, or otherwise treated differently than other
individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids or services.” 42 U.S.C. §
12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (1990).
28
42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (1990) (emphasis added).
24
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these definitions,29 generally including law enforcement agencies
within the ADA’s ambit.30 Furthermore, according to the Supreme
Court, the ADA contains no explicit exceptions that “could cast the
coverage” of law enforcement agencies “into doubt.”31 Thus, law
enforcement agencies and the respective services they administer,
including arrests, “fall squarely within” the ADA’s statutory
definition of “public entit[ies].”32
Administrative regulations proffered by the DOJ further support
this broad reading.33 The DOJ, through the Attorney General, has
the sole authority to promulgate regulations and guidelines for the
implementation of Title II procedures,34 and is explicitly authorized
to oversee regulations for “[a]ll programs, services, and regulatory
activities relating to law enforcement.”35 The DOJ has provided that,
in order to comply with the ADA, law enforcement agencies have
the affirmative obligation to adopt reasonable policies that prevent
discrimination of people with disabilities during their encounters
with law enforcement, including arrests.36

29
As the Ninth Circuit has noted, “[d]iscrimination includes a failure to
reasonably accommodate a person’s disability.” Sheehan v. City and County of
San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014); see also 28 C.F.R. §
35.130(b)(7) (2011).
30
See infra Part III; see also Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 916 (8th Cir.
1998) (extending the ADA’s definition of public entity to include local police
departments).
31
See Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209
(1998) (holding that the text of the ADA is unambiguous in regards to the breadth
of its coverage).
32
See id. at 210.
33
DOJ guidelines revised in 2006 state “[l]aw enforcement agencies are
covered [by Title II of the ADA] because they are programs of State or local
governments, regardless of whether they receive Federal grants or other Federal
funds. The ADA affects virtually everything that officers and deputies do, for
example . . . arresting, booking, and holding suspects.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
Commonly Asked Questions About the Americans with Disabilities Act and Law
Enforcement § I, http://www.ada.gov/q%26a_law.htm (last modified Apr. 4,
2006).
34
See 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a) (1990).
35
28 C.F.R. § 35.190(b)(6) (2011).
36
See 28 C.F.R. Pt. 35, App. B (“The general regulatory obligation to modify
policies, practices, or procedures requires law enforcement to make changes in
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The ADA regulations require public entities to actively
accommodate individuals based on their needs in order to avoid
discrimination; it is not enough to merely refrain from
discriminatory practices.37 In other words, public entities have an
“affirmative duty” to provide reasonable accommodations for
people with disabilities in order to avoid discrimination.38 This
obligation is even more apparent in other sections of the ADA where
it is expressly included in the text of the statute.39
There are a few notable exceptions to this obligation. First, the
plain text of the regulations offers two obvious limitations on a
public entity’s obligation to provide reasonable accommodations in
its policies and practices.40 Second, the DOJ has further
acknowledged an exigency exception—that “[p]olice officers may,
of course, respond appropriately to real threats to health or safety,
even if an individual’s actions are a result of her or his disability.”41
The DOJ has suggested that people who pose a direct threat to others
may not even qualify for protection under Title II.42 However, this

policies that result in discriminatory arrests or abuse of individuals with
disabilities.”).
37
In the reasonable accommodations provision, the ADA regulations require
that “[a] public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices,
or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on
the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or
activity.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2011).
38
See David A. Maas, Expecting the Unreasonable: Why a Specific Request
Requirement for ADA Title II Discrimination Claim Fails to Protect Those Who
Cannot Request Reasonable Accommodations, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 217,
218, 220 (2011).
39
See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2008).
40
First, any such accommodation needs only to be reasonable. Second, the
public entity may be excused from this obligation if it can make a showing that
the providing the accommodation would “fundamentally alter” the nature of the
services provided. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2011).
41
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 33, § II.
42
See 28 C.F.R. § 35.139(a) (2011) (“This part does not require a public
entity to permit an individual to participate in or benefit from the services,
programs, or activities of that public entity when that individual poses a direct
threat to the health or safety of others.”). Similarly, “[a]n individual who poses a
direct threat to the health or safety of others will not be qualified.” ADA Title II
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exigency exception is not absolute according to the DOJ.43 A public
entity must still consider whether reasonable accommodations
would help defuse the situation and “mitigate the risk” in evaluating
a direct threat.44
Finally, as the institution that Congress expressly designated to
regulate compliance with the ADA, the DOJ’s interpretations must
be considered binding in the absence of a judicial finding that the
regulations are arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to legislative
intent.45 Therefore, because the DOJ has definitively concluded that
Title II of the ADA applies to arrests and related law enforcement
services, this interpretation must be given controlling weight.46

Technical Assistance Manual, II-2.8000 [hereinafter ADA Title II Manual],
http://www.ada.gov/taman2.html#II-2.8000 (last visited Sept. 16, 2016).
43
As the DOJ indicates, “it is important that police officers are trained to
distinguish behaviors that pose a real risk from behaviors that do not, and to
recognize when an individual, such as someone who is having a seizure or
exhibiting signs of psychotic crisis, needs medical attention.” U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., supra note 33, § II.
44
See 28 C.F.R. Pt. 35, App. B (“Although persons with disabilities are
generally entitled to the protection of this part, a person who poses a significant
risk to others will not be ‘qualified,’ if reasonable modifications to the public
entity’s policies, practices, or procedures will not eliminate that risk”); ADA Title
II Manual, supra note 42; see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.139(b) (“In determining
whether an individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others, a public
entity must make an individualized assessment, based on reasonable judgment
that relies on current medical knowledge or on the best available objective
evidence, to ascertain . . . whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices,
or procedures or the provision of auxiliary aids or services will mitigate the risk.”).
45
See ABF Freight System, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 510 U.S. 317, 324 (1994)
(quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)) (“When
Congress expressly delegates to an administrative agency the authority to make
specific policy determinations, courts must give the agency’s decision controlling
weight unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”).
46
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur in
Part and Reversal in Part at 14, City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan 135
S. Ct. 1765 (2015) (No. 13-1412), 2015 WL 254640; see also Olmstead v. L.C.
ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 597–98 (1999) (“Because the Department is the
agency directed by Congress to issue regulations implementing Title II . . . its
views warrant respect.”); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 646 (1998) (applying
Chevron’s deferential standard to the DOJ’s interpretation of ADA Title III).
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II. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO V. SHEEHAN
The scope of the ADA relating to law enforcement was recently
tested in Sheehan v. City and County of San Francisco.47 The issue
proved to be particularly salient because in August 2008, police
officers, responding to a call to help transport Teresa Sheehan for
mental health treatment, tragically shot and nearly killed her.48
Sheehan lived in Conard House, a group home for persons with
mental illness.49 On August 7, 2008, Heath Hodge, a social worker,
visited Sheehan to conduct a routine welfare check.50 Hodge was
concerned that Sheehan had been off her medications for months,
had stopped attending her weekly counseling sessions, and was
inadequately caring for herself.51 He reported that, when Sheehan
did not respond to his initial knocking, he used his key to enter
Sheehan’s private room without her permission.52 After addressing
Sheehan several times to no avail, she reportedly suddenly sprang
up and yelled, “Get out of here! You don’t have a warrant! I have a
knife and I’ll kill you if I have to!”53 Hodge then backed out of the
room and Sheehan slammed the door shut, locking it behind her.54
Concerned for Sheehan’s well-being and the safety of other
residents and staff, Hodge cleared the building, completed an
application to have Sheehan temporarily detained for psychiatric
evaluation and treatment, and requested police help for transporting
Sheehan to a secure mental health facility.55 Officers Holder and
Reynolds responded to the call and met with Hodge to assess the
situation before attempting to seize Sheehan.56 The officers,
accompanied by Hodge, knocked on Sheehan’s door and announced

47

See Sheehan v. City and County of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir.
2014), rev’d in part, cert dismissed in part, (135 S. Ct. 1765) (2015).
48
Id. at 1215.
49
Id. at 1217.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 1218.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 1217.
56
Id. at 1218.
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their presence as police officers.57 They then entered the room with
Hodge’s key, again without Sheehan’s permission.58 Sheehan
reacted violently to this intrusion, allegedly grabbing a knife and
threatening to kill the officers.59 The officers retreated and Sheehan
again slammed the door behind them.60 The officers called for
backup, but rather than wait for it to arrive, forcibly reentered
Sheehan’s room brandishing their weapons because they were
concerned that Sheehan may have had a means of escape or the
chance to gather more weapons.61 Believing that Sheehan was
threateningly advancing on them with a knife, the officers pepper
sprayed and shot Sheehan five or six times.62 Sheehan survived the
shooting, but her life was forever changed as a result.63
The City of San Francisco then prosecuted Sheehan for assault
with a deadly weapon and making criminal threats.64 The jury
acquitted Sheehan of the criminal threat charges but could not reach
a verdict on the assault charges.65 The prosecutors decided not to
retry Sheehan.66 Sheehan then filed suit herself in the U.S. District
57

Id.
Id.
59
Id. at 1218–19.
60
Id. at 1219.
61
Id. However, as the officers conceded, there was no consideration of
Sheehan’s disability when deciding to force a reentry. Id. Further, Sheehan argued
that the officers failed to discuss alternative tactics or accommodations that could
have been employed to defuse the situation. Id. at 1232.
62
Id. at 1219–20. However the exact number of shots fired is unclear. A
recent exposé on Teresa Sheehan’s life and ordeals prompted by this incident
reports “[t]here were 14 bullet holes in her body.” Allen, supra note 10.
63
Aside from the physical, mental, emotional, and social trauma resulting
from the shooting, Sheehan has also been forced to endure dramatic lifestyle
changes. Teresa’s sisters, Patricia and Frances Sheehan, say that Teresa is forced
to live in a single-room-occupancy hotel because it was the only facility available
that could accommodate her physical disabilities resulting from the shooting. See
Allen, supra note 10. They have also realized the unfortunate likelihood that
Teresa is not receiving psychiatric care or counseling for the trauma of being shot.
Id. Finally, they say that Teresa’s mental and social health has deteriorated as a
result of her shooting, believing that she has become “much more withdrawn” and
“more childlike.” Id.
64
Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1220.
65
Id.
66
Id.
58
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Court for the Northern District of California, alleging, among other
claims, violations of her Fourth Amendment rights and her rights
under the ADA.67 The District Court granted the State’s motion for
summary judgment against all of Sheehan’s claims.68 In dismissing
Sheehan’s ADA claim, the court relied on the Fifth Circuit’s
decision in Hainze v. Richards69 and held that, because “the officers
attempted to detain a violent, mentally disabled individual under
exigent circumstances[,] [i]t would be unreasonable to ask officers,
in such a situation, to first determine whether their actions would
comply with the ADA before protecting themselves and others.”70
Sheehan then appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which vacated in
part by holding that the District Court erred in granting summary
judgment on Sheehan’s ADA claims.71 The court held that police
are not excused from the ADA’s reasonable accommodations
requirement, specifically noting that Title II of the ADA applies to
arrests.72 Rather than create a categorical exigency exception, the
court determined that exigency is but one factor to consider under
the ADA’s reasonableness analysis.73
The City of San Francisco subsequently petitioned for a writ of
certiorari and asked the Supreme Court to review whether Title II of
the ADA required law enforcement agencies to provide reasonable
accommodations in their seizures of mentally ill suspects, even
when faced with exigent circumstances.74 The Supreme Court
expected to rule on the State’s argument raised below, that “Title II
does not apply to an officer’s on-the-street responses to reported
67

Id.
See Sheehan v. City and County of San Francisco, No. C 09-03889(CRB),
2011 WL 1748419, at *9 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2011).
69
The Fifth Circuit held that the ADA “does not apply to an officer’s onthe-street responses to reported disturbances or other similar incidents,
whether or not those calls involve subjects with mental disabilities, prior to the
officer’s securing the scene and ensuring that there is no threat to human life.”
Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2000).
70
Sheehan, 2011 WL 1748419 at 11.
71
Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1234.
72
Id. at 1232.
73
Id. The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning will be discussed in greater detail infra
Part III.
74
City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S.Ct. 1765, 1772
(2015).
68
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disturbances or other similar incidents, whether or not those calls
involve subjects with mental disabilities, prior to the officer’s
securing the scene and ensuring that there is no threat to human
life.”75 However, San Francisco raised an entirely new argument in
its petition for certiorari, namely that Sheehan did not qualify for
accommodations under the ADA.76
The Court recognized that San Francisco’s new argument was
“predicated on the proposition that the ADA governs the manner in
which a qualified individual with a disability is arrested,”77 and
noted that there may be circumstances where reasonable
accommodations could sufficiently mitigate the risk presented by a
potentially violent suspect.78 Because San Francisco no longer relied
on its earlier argument, there was no contrary view to the
presumption that the ADA applies to arrests, thus the Supreme Court
exercised its discretion to dismiss the question as improvidently
granted.79 Despite its ruling, the Court acknowledged that
“[w]hether [the ADA] applies to arrests is an important question that
would benefit from briefing and an adversary presentation,”80
essentially inviting a procedurally sound case to address this
contentious issue in the future.

75

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 1772–73. San Francisco’s new argument was that “a person who
poses a direct threat or significant risk to the safety of others is not qualified for
accommodations under the ADA.” Id. at 1773. Because Sheehan posed a
significant safety risk, San Francisco contended that she was therefore not a
qualified individual entitled to ADA protection. Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 1774. In a scathing opinion, Justice Scalia went even further,
criticizing the City for employing “bait-and-switch” tactics. Id. at 1779 (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
80
Id. at 1773. Justice Scalia, agreeing with the Court’s decision to dismiss
the question as improvidently granted, observed in his concurring opinion, “[w]e
were thus deprived of the opportunity to consider, and settle, a controverted
question of law that has divided the Circuits, and were invited instead to decide
an ADA question that has relevance only if we assume the Ninth Circuit correctly
resolved the antecedent, unargued question on which we granted certiorari.” Id.
at 1779 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
76

TRYING TO FIT A SQUARE PEG INTO A ROUND HOLE 565
III. THE CIRCUITS ARE SPLIT ON WHETHER THE ADA APPLIES TO
ARRESTS
Without an affirmative interpretation from the Supreme Court,
the issue of whether, and to what extent, the ADA applies to arrests
remains an open question and has resulted in a circuit split. The
majority of circuits have held that the ADA does apply to arrests and
other related law enforcement activities,81 but that exigent
circumstances must inform the reasonableness determination under
the ADA.82 However some courts, most prominently the Fifth
Circuit, have been hesitant to expand the ADA’s scope.83
The Ninth Circuit has broadly applied Title II coverage to all
public entity functions.84 In Sheehan, the court held that the ADA’s
reasonable accommodations requirement broadly applies to all
police services and activities, including arrests.85 However, the court
did narrow its holding by placing some potential limitations on the
reasonableness inquiry. The court looked to other circuits for their
views on whether the ADA applies to police encounters and found
that although the ADA applies to arrests, “exigent circumstances
inform the reasonableness analysis under the ADA, just as they

81

See, e.g., Mark Joseph Stern, Don’t Answer That!, SLATE (May 18, 2015),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/05/sheehan
_case_of_police_shooting_mentally_ill_woman_san_francisco_saved_the.html.
82
See, e.g., Sheehan v. City and County of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211,
1232 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d in part, cert dismissed in part, (15 S. Ct. 1765) (2015).
83
See, e.g., Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2000); see also
Roberts v. City of Omaha, 723 F.3d 966, 973 (8th Cir. 2013) (noting that it is
unclear what, if any, obligations the ADA imposes on officers attempting to detain
a violent suspect, the court held that “nothing in the law clearly established that
the ADA . . . applied to the undisputed circumstances of this case”).
84
See Barden v. City of Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002)
(“Rather than determining whether each function of a city can be characterized as
a service, program, or activity for purposes of Title II . . . we have construed the
ADA’s broad language [as] bring[ing] within its scope anything a public entity
does.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lee v.
City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 691 (9th Cir. 2001)).
85
Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232.
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inform the distinct reasonableness analysis under the Fourth
Amendment.”86
The Ninth Circuit also declined to make a categorical,
prophylactic reasonableness determination by reaffirming that
reasonableness is a question of fact better left to a jury.87 The court
noted that this is especially important in the law enforcement context
86
Id. (citing Waller ex rel. Estate of Hunt v. City of Danville, 556 F.3d 171,
175 (4th Cir. 2009)). The Fourth Circuit in Waller concluded that, similar to the
Ninth Circuit’s analysis, although the ADA does apply to police encounters,
exigent circumstances must be considered when determining the extent and scope
of reasonable accommodations. Waller ex rel. Estate of Hunt v. City of Danville,
556 F.3d 171, 175 (4th Cir. 2009). The court noted that “[r]easonableness in law
is generally assessed in light of the totality of the circumstances, and exigency is
one circumstance that bears materially on the inquiry into reasonableness under
the ADA.” Id. The Fourth Circuit again addressed the issue of the ADA’s
application to police encounters in Seremeth v. Board of County Commissioners
Frederick County and held that police activities are unambiguously subject to
ADA protections. Seremeth v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs Frederick Cty., 673 F.3d 333,
337 (4th Cir. 2012). Mirroring Waller, the court noted, “while there is no separate
exigent-circumstances inquiry, the consideration of exigent circumstances is
included in the determination of the reasonableness of the accommodation.” Id. at
339. In Bircoll v. Miami-Dade County, the Eleventh Circuit reached a similar
conclusion and reasoned:
The question is not so much one of the applicability of the ADA
because Title II prohibits discrimination by a public entity by
reason of [an individual’s] disability. The exigent
circumstances presented by criminal activity and the already
onerous tasks of police on the scene go more to the
reasonableness of the requested ADA modification than
whether the ADA applies in the first instance.
Bircoll v. Miami-Dade County, 480 F.3d 1072, 1085 (11th Cir. 2007). The court
examined the text of the ADA and explained that the final clause of § 12132
“protects qualified individuals with a disability from being ‘subjected to
discrimination by any such entity,’ and is not tied directly to the ‘services,
programs, or activities’ of the public entity.” Id. (quoting Bledsoe v. Palm Beach
Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 133 F.3d 816, 821–22 (11th Cir. 1998)).
The court then concluded that Title II “is a catch-all phrase that prohibits all
discrimination by a public entity, regardless of the context.” Id. (quoting Bledsoe,
133 F.3d at 822). The court further emphasized that the reasonableness
determination in the Title II ADA context is not a bright-line rule but rather a
highly functional, case-by-case standard. Id. at 1086.
87
Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1233 (citing EEOC v. UPS Supply Chain Solutions,
620 F.3d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 2010)).
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and highlighted countervailing considerations that should inform the
reasonableness inquiry: the need for officers to make split-second
decisions when confronting an armed and potentially dangerous
suspect,88 as well as whether de-escalation tactics and reasonable
accommodations are available to sufficiently defuse the situation.89
The court concluded that in Sheehan’s case, “[a] reasonable
jury . . . could find that the situation had been defused sufficiently,
following the initial retreat from Sheehan’s room, to afford the
officers an opportunity to wait for backup and to employ less
confrontational tactics, including the accommodations that Sheehan
asserts were necessary.”90 Sheehan asserted that, among other
claims, “the officers should have respected her comfort zone,
engaged in non-threatening communications and used the passage
of time to defuse the situation rather than precipitating a deadly
confrontation.”91 The court declined to adopt an outright deferential
standard favoring police officers, instead suggesting a more holistic
analysis where officers’ needs for split-second decision making is
merely one factor to inform the reasonable analysis under the
ADA.92
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit in Gohier v. Enright held that “a
broad rule categorically excluding arrests from the scope of Title
II . . . is not the law.”93 In Gohier, a presumed mentally ill man was
shot and killed by a police officer after repeatedly ignoring warnings
and making a “stabbing motion” with what police believed was a
knife.94 The decedent’s estate brought suit against the officer and the
city of Colorado Springs alleging excessive use of force, failure to
train, and violations under Title II of the ADA.95 The court identified
two theoretical bases for Title II claims arising from arrests:
wrongful arrests, where “police wrongly arrested someone with a
disability because they misperceived the effects of that disability as
criminal activity;” and reasonable accommodations, where police
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1233–34.
Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1221 (10th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1218.
Id.
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“failed to reasonably accommodate the person’s disability in the
course of investigation or arrest, causing the person to suffer greater
injury or indignity in that process than other arrestees.”96 However,
in order to raise a successful reasonable accommodations claim, the
court indicated that a plaintiff would have to identify and raise
specific arguments about what officers should have done differently
in effectuating an arrest.97 Ultimately, the court refused to adopt
either the “wrongful arrest” or “reasonable accommodation” theory,
which asks the question whether ADA claims must be constrained
to these two categorical bases.98
The Second Circuit has adopted a slightly different approach to
recognizing ADA claims in the context of law enforcement duties.99
After broadly holding that all public entities fall under the ADA
umbrella,100 the Second Circuit addressed the question of whether
the ADA applies to arrests and related police activity in Anthony v.
City of New York.101 In Anthony, New York Police Department
officers responded to a 911 call from an incoherent, possibly
emotionally disturbed woman in regards to potential domestic
violence.102 When officers arrived at the scene, however, they found
Anthony, a woman with Down syndrome, alone in the apartment.103
The officers were unable to contact Anthony’s legal guardian, and
at their supervisor’s command, handcuffed Anthony and took her to
96

Id. at 1220–21.
Id. at 1222. The court acknowledged that Gohier might have stated a valid
claim under Title II of the ADA if he had argued that Title II required public
agencies to “better train its police officers to recognize reported disturbances that
are likely to involve persons with mental disabilities, and to investigate and arrest
such persons in a manner reasonably accommodating their disability.” Id.
98
The Gohier court recognized an ADA claim that was “logically
intermediate between the two archetypes envisioned by those theories.” Id. at
1221.
99
See Anthony v. City of New York, 339 F.3d 129, 140–41 (2d Cir. 2003).
100
See Reg’l Econ. Cmty. Action Program v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d
35, 45 (2d Cir. 2002) (“The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act . . . prohibit all
discrimination based on disability by public entities.”) superseded by statute,
ADA Amendments of 2008, Pub.L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, as recognized
in Anderson Group, LLC v. City of Saratoga Springs, 805 F.3d 34 (2d. Cir. 2015).
101
See generally Anthony, 339 F.3d 129.
102
Id. at 133.
103
See id. at 132–33.
97
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the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation.104 Anthony and her legal
guardian sued the officers, alleging, among other claims, violations
of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and her rights under
the ADA.105
Although recognizing that Title II of the ADA may indeed apply
to law enforcement services, the court narrowly focused its
discussion on whether the officers’ actions were primarily motivated
by discriminatory intent,106 and found there were insufficient facts
to warrant an ADA violation.107 Surprisingly, the Second Circuit did
not discuss whether law enforcement officials were obligated to
provide reasonable accommodations pursuant to the ADA, and the
court has yet to affirmatively decide this issue. The Second Circuit
may soon have another opportunity, however, after a recent decision
in the District Court for the Southern District of New York in
Williams v. City of New York.108 Williams arose from the seizure and
overnight detention of a deaf woman, whom officers made no
attempt to accommodate by providing an interpreter or other
104

Id. at 133–34.
Id. at 134.
106
Id. at 141. The court read this discriminatory intent requirement into the
ADA and concluded that “[t]here is no evidence . . . that the [police actions] were
motivated by discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” Id. The Sixth
Circuit has also read a threshold discriminatory intent requirement into the ADA
provisions. See Tucker v. Tenn., 539 F.3d 526, 532 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he
plaintiff must show that the discrimination was intentionally directed toward him
or her in particular.”). The Sixth Circuit in Tucker noted that even if arrests were
covered by the ADA, a determination the court carefully abstained from making,
intent to discriminate is the driving factor in the reasonableness analysis. See
Tucker, 539 F.3d at 536 (“Accordingly, even if the arrest were within the ambit
of the ADA, the district court correctly found that the City Police did not
intentionally discriminate against [appellants] because of their disabilities in
violation of the ADA.”).
107
Anthony, 339 F.3d at 141.
108
See Williams v. City of New York, 121 F. Supp. 3d 354, 365 (S.D.N.Y.
2015) (“A number of courts have considered whether interactions between law
enforcement and disabled individuals—whether initiated by the disabled
individual or the police and whether the interaction culminates in an arrest—are
‘services, programs, or activities’ subject to the requirement of accommodation
under Title II of the ADA. Those courts have generally found that Title II applies,
but the reasonableness of the accommodation required must be assessed in light
of the totality of the circumstances of the particular case.”).
105
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communication aid.109 The court unequivocally denied the City’s
argument that the ADA does not require police officers to provide
accommodations when effectuating an arrest110 and held that the
ADA applies to all law enforcement interactions.111
However, other courts have narrowly interpreted the ADA and
have declined to extend coverage to police encounters. In Rosen v.
Montgomery County Maryland, the Fourth Circuit dealt with a case
in which a deaf person was arrested for driving while under the
influence of alcohol.112 The court acknowledged that the defendant
had a qualifying disability, but was reluctant to expand the scope of
the ADA.113 Emphasizing that Rosen failed to raise specific
arguments bringing the circumstances of his arrest within the scope
of the ADA,114 the Fourth Circuit also relied on the fact that Rosen
failed to establish that his injury was a result of prejudice due to his
disability.115 The court flatly refused to accept that police officers
might be required to provide reasonable accommodations when

109

Id. at 359.
Id. at 364–65 (“The City’s crabbed interpretation of Title II’s coverage of
police activity simply does not comport with the language of Title II and its
implementing regulations, particularly in light of the remedial purpose of the
statute and the weight of authority that has considered the issue.”).
111
Id. at 368 (“The only reasonable interpretation of Title II is that law
enforcement officers who are acting in an investigative or custodial capacity are
performing ‘services, programs, or activities’ within the scope of Title II. Whether
a disabled individual succeeds in proving discrimination under Title II of the ADA
will depend on whether the officers’ accommodations were reasonable under the
circumstances.”).
112
See Rosen v. Montgomery County, 121 F.3d 154, 155–56 (4th Cir. 1997).
113
Id. at 157 (“[C]alling a drunk driving arrest a ‘program or activity’ of the
County, the ‘essential eligibility requirements’ of which (in this case) are weaving
in traffic and being intoxicated, strikes us as a stretch of the statutory language
and of the underlying legislative intent.”).
114
Id. (“Rosen points to nothing in the ADA itself or in the regulations that
specifically bring arrests within the ADA’s ambit, despite the fact that such
‘program or activity’ is one that is ‘participated in’ by millions of persons every
year.”).
115
Id. at 158 (“Rosen is simply unable to point to any tangible adverse
consequence resulting from the manner of his arrest . . . . Our decision to
affirm . . . is based on an even more fundamental infirmity: the lack of any
discernible injury.”).
110
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conducting an initial search or seizure.116 Despite this ruling, more
recent decisions by the Fourth Circuit have considerably narrowed
Rosen’s precedential reach.117
The Fifth Circuit in Hainze v. Richards reached a conclusion
similar to Rosen, holding that118 “Title II does not apply to an
officer’s on-the-street responses to reported disturbances or other
similar incidents, whether or not those calls involve subjects with
mental disabilities, prior to the officer’s securing the scene and
ensuring that there is no threat to human life.”119 Like Sheehan,120
police were dispatched to transport Hainze “to a hospital for mental
health treatment.”121 Officers witnessed Hainze with a knife in his
hand standing next to the passenger door of a pickup truck.122 One
of the officers immediately drew his gun and ordered Hainze away
from the truck.123 Hainze responded with profanities and began to
walk towards the officer, at which point the remaining officers
exited their vehicles with their weapons drawn.124 Despite repeated
warnings to stop, Hainze continued walking towards the officers and
was shot twice in the chest.125 Merely twenty seconds elapsed from
the time the officers responded to the 911 call to the time Hainze
was shot.126 The Hainze court rejected Hainze’s claims for relief and
116

Id. (“If we assume however, that the police were required to provide
[reasonable accommodations] at some point in the process, that point certainly
cannot be placed before the arrival at the stationhouse.”).
117
Recognizing that Rosen’s narrow interpretation of the ADA seems
contrary to legislative intent, and noting that “[c]ourts across the country have
called Rosen’s holding into question,” the Fourth Circuit in Seremeth adopted a
broad reading of the ADA and emphasized a narrow interpretation of Rosen.
Seremeth v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs Frederick Cty., 673 F.3d 333, 337–38 (4th Cir.
2012) (“Rosen’s precedential reach is more properly cast as limited to the injury
grounds necessary to reach its conclusion.”).
118
See Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2000).
119
Id.
120
Sheehan v. City and County of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th
Cir. 2014), rev’d in part, cert dismissed in part, (135 S. Ct. 1765) (2015).
121
Hainze, 207 F.3d at 797.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
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upheld a deferential standard towards law enforcement officers’
need for split-second decision-making.127 The Fifth Circuit held,
Law enforcement personnel conducting in-the-field
investigations already face the onerous task of
frequently having to instantaneously identify, assess,
and react to potentially life-threatening situations. To
require the officers to factor in whether their actions
are going to comply with the ADA, in the presence
of exigent circumstances and prior to securing the
safety of themselves, other officers, and any nearby
civilians, would pose an unnecessary risk to
innocents.128
The Fifth Circuit in effect created a categorical exception
covering exigent circumstances by holding that the affirmative
duties imposed by Title II of the ADA do not extend to officers in
the field in potentially dangerous situations.129
This categorical exigency exception allows law enforcement
officers to execute their duties without the potential burden of
having to delay taking action to identify what, if any, reasonable
accommodations are necessary in a given situation.130 As the Hainze
court explained, “[w]hile the purpose of the ADA is to prevent the
discrimination of disabled individuals, we do not think Congress
intended that the fulfillment of that objective be attained at the
expense of the safety of the general public.”131 However, by fixating
on first securing the scene at all costs, the Fifth Circuit endorsed an
exigency justification that completely overlooked the potential
equity of more accommodating de-escalation tactics.
For instance, the Fifth Circuit focused on the threat that Hainze
created by advancing on the officers with a knife; however there was
127

See id. at 801–02 (“We are not persuaded that requiring . . . officers to
use less than reasonable force in defending themselves and others, or to hesitate
to consider other possible actions in the course of making such split-second
decisions, is the type of ‘reasonable accommodation’ contemplated by Title II.”).
128
Id. at 801.
129
Id.
130
See Maas, supra note 38, at 221 (“This narrow exception allows officers
to function in their law enforcement capacity without the unreasonable burden of
proactively accommodating persons with disabilities.”).
131
Hainze, 207 F.3d at 801.
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no discussion of alternative, less restrictive methods that the
responding officers could have implemented to avoid a potentially
lethal confrontation. The officers in Hainze were aware that they
were dispatched to transport a mentally ill, and potentially suicidal,
individual to a hospital for mental health treatment, yet their initial
response was to draw their weapons.132 Adding to the predicament,
the officers’ violent response was predicated on a misguided
assumption that Hainze was a public safety threat.133 Unfortunately,
this mistake of fact is all too common in seizures of persons with
I/DD or mental illness.134
These circuit court opinions merely touch on the broad
continuum of needs and accommodations that can arise in the
intersection between individuals with I/DD and mental illness and
law enforcement.135 This is one of the primary reasons why more
proactive accommodations are necessary. As this circuit split
132

See id. at 797.
See id. (“When the officers [responded to the 911 call], Hainze was
holding a knife and standing next to a pickup truck occupied by two persons. The
police did not then know that the persons were unharmed and were related to
Hainze.”). The Fifth Circuit took this into consideration but concluded that the
officers’ actions were reasonable and “were the result of a quick discretionary
decision made in self-defense and for the safety of those at the scene.” Id. at 801.
134
See Lowery et al., supra note 5 (discussing Gary Page and a police
encounter in response to a 911 call in which he stated that he wanted suicide-bycops). In Gary Page’s story, officers arrived on the scene to find that Page had
taken a hostage. Id. According to the report, “[t]hey opened fire, striking him five
times in the torso and once in the head. Page’s gun later turned out to be a starter
pistol, loaded only with blanks. His threats of violence turned out to be equally
empty, the product of emotional instability and agonizing despair.” Id. In a similar
encounter, Daniel Covarrubias, who had a history of depression and substance
abuse, on the day he was shot and killed by the police, “was taking powerful
painkillers for a broken collarbone” and was in a hallucinogenic state. Id.
Covarrubias was hiding from police and when confronted allegedly pointed a
“dark object” at officers, which was mistakenly believed to be a gun. Id. The
“police opened fire, hitting Covarrubias five times, including once in the
head . . . .The dark object in his hand turned out to be a cellphone.” Id.
135
See Maas, supra note 38, at 220 (“However, the existing jurisprudence
has not fully addressed all of the complicated and sensitive issues that arise in the
interactions between persons with disabilities and law enforcement. In particular,
courts have not grappled with the reality that many persons with disabilities are
incapable of articulating their needs to police officers.”).
133
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illustrates, although the Supreme Court in Sheehan may have been
procedurally correct to dismiss the issue as improvidently granted,
the Court nonetheless missed a critical opportunity to resolve a
significant unsettled issue of law.136
IV. ADDITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR WHY THE ADA APPLIES TO
ARRESTS AND RELATED LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES
A. The ADA Is Inextricably Tied to the Fourth Amendment
in These Instances
Instances of police shootings of mentally ill individuals or
suspects with I/DD implicate not only the ADA’s reasonable
accommodations requirement but also the Fourth Amendment’s
Constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures.137 The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
provides in pertinent part “[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable

136

As San Francisco pointed out in its petition for certiorari, “[t]his case
provides the Court with its first opportunity to resolve this question, in a case
where a public entity’s potential liability turns on the answer.” Petition for Writ
of Certiorari at 22, City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan 135 S. Ct. 1765
(2015) (No. 13-1412), 2014 WL 2201057 (“This case presents a suitable vehicle
to address this conflict. Certiorari was sought only twice before in the relevant
cases.”).
137
Holding that a jury could find that the officers’ forced second entry into
Sheehan’s apartment was unreasonable, the Sheehan court held “we cannot say as
a matter of law that the officers continued to carry out the search or seizure in a
reasonable manner when they decided to force the second entry, without taking
Sheehan’s mental illness into account and in an apparent departure from their
police officer training.” Sheehan v. City and County of San Francisco, 743 F.3d
1211, 1225 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d in part, cert. dismissed in part, 135 S. Ct. 1765
(2015); see also Nicole Flatow, Supreme Court Takes on Major Case on Police
Shootings,
THINKPROGRESS
(Dec.
2,
2014),
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2014/12/02/3598052/the-supreme-court-agreedto-hear-a-case-about-police-shootings-of-those-with-mental-illness/
(“[The
Sheehan case] is not about cops’ criminal liability. It’s about whether cops are
obligated to take special precautions in using deadly force — and in entering an
individual’s home without a warrant or permission — when they know an
individual was mentally ill.”).
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searches and seizures.”138 As the Supreme Court has further
emphasized, “[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness.”139 Likewise, the ADA regulations require public
entities to provide reasonable accommodations for individuals with
disabilities when necessary to avoid discrimination.140
Reasonableness therefore forms an essential element and common
focus of both the Fourth Amendment’s limitations on searches and
seizures as well as Title II of the ADA’s accommodations
requirement.141 The ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirement
cannot help but inform the reasonableness determination under the
Fourth Amendment.
In its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has
adopted a balancing test to determine the reasonableness of a search
or seizure.142 The Supreme Court has promulgated two distinct
prongs of the reasonableness analysis: “whether the officer’s action
was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related
in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place.”143 The Court further explained in Terry v. Ohio that
[i]n order to assess . . . reasonableness . . . as a general
proposition, it is necessary ‘first to focus upon the
governmental interest which allegedly justifies
official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected
interests of the private citizen,’ for there is ‘no ready
test for determining reasonableness other than by
balancing the need to search (or seize) against the
invasion which the search (or seizure) entails.’144
138

U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001).
140
See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2011).
141
As the Ninth Circuit held in Sheehan, “[t]he ADA . . . applies to arrests,
though we agree . . . that exigent circumstances inform the reasonableness analysis
under the ADA, just as they inform the distinct reasonableness analysis under the
Fourth Amendment.” Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232 (citing Waller ex rel. Estate of
Hunt v. City of Danville, 556 F.3d 171, 175 (4th Cir. 2009)) (“Just as the
constraints of time figure in what is required of police under the Fourth
Amendment, they bear on what is reasonable under the ADA.”).
142
See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007).
143
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
144
Id. at 20–21 (brackets in original) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 534–35, 536–37 (1967)).
139
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The Court applied this balancing test in the context of excessive
force and declared in Graham v. Connor that the reasonableness
standard applies to “all claims that law enforcement officers have
used excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest,
investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen.”145 The Court
adopted a functional approach that requires a case-by-case
determination, paying specific attention to the facts and
circumstances of each case, including whether exigent
circumstances prompted the officer’s actions.146 This totality of the
circumstances analysis is germane for ADA purposes because, due
to the affirmative duty that the ADA places on public entities to
provide reasonable accommodations, it is impossible to analyze the
facts and circumstances of particular cases involving suspects with
I/DD without considering if reasonable accommodations were
required, and to what extent they were provided.147
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Sheehan provides a useful
framework for recognizing the merits of the totality of the
circumstances approach for judging the reasonableness of police
actions. The Ninth Circuit considered the totality of the
circumstances in determining the reasonableness of the officers’
forced second entry into Sheehan’s apartment and “conclude[d] that
a reasonable jury could find that the officers’ . . . [actions were]
objectively unreasonable.”148 The court emphasized that Sheehan’s
mental illness should have informed the officer’s choice of
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Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 396.
147
See generally Michael Avery, Unreasonable Seizures of Unreasonable
People: Defining the Totality of Circumstances Relevant to Assessing the Police
Use of Force Against Emotionally Disturbed People, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 261, 267 (2003) (“[C]ourts should consider the emotional state of the
subject, the training available to, and actually provided to, the officers
involved . . . and the choices made by officers leading up to the use of force that
may have influenced the necessity of resolving an incident through force.”);
Waller ex rel. Estate of Hunt v. City of Danville, 556 F.3d 171, 175 (4th Cir. 2009)
(“A reasonable belief on the part of officers ‘that this was a potentially violent
hostage situation’ may not resolve the ADA inquiry, but it cannot help but inform
it.”).
148
Sheehan v. City and County of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1226 (9th
Cir. 2014), rev’d in part, cert. dismissed in part, 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015).
146
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tactics,149 and succinctly noted the fundamental flaw with what
transpired: “[t]he officers’ decision to force an entry was in effect a
decision to cause a violent—and potentially deadly—confrontation
with a mentally ill person without a countervailing need.”150
Conversely, neither of the two cases discussed above that have
pushed back the most regarding the ADA, Hainze and Rosen,
considered the totality of the circumstances in their analyses.151
Viewing the totality of the circumstances when analyzing police
encounters will serve to broaden the lens of review of police
encounters and allow for greater scrutiny on use of police force.
B. Examining Disability Rights Elsewhere in the Criminal
Justice System
An examination of the Supreme Court’s disability-related
jurisprudence in other sectors of the criminal justice system reveals
a commitment to more stringent protections for persons with mental
illnesses and I/DD. In 1998, the Supreme Court issued a watershed
decision that marked a turning point for implementing the ADA’s
extensive protections. In a sweeping opinion in Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections v. Yeskey, the late Justice Scalia, writing
for a unanimous court, concluded that Title II of the ADA
“unambiguously extends to state prison inmates.”152 In rejecting the
argument that “qualified individual with a disability” as it is defined
in the ADA is ambiguous in regards to state prisoners, the Court held
that by its express terms the ADA applies to anyone with a disability,
with no specific exceptions for prison inmates.153 The Court further
responded to the argument that the ADA’s statement of findings and
purpose154 did not expressly mention state prisoners and explained
that, even assuming arguendo that Congress did not envision the
ADA applying to state prisoners, “in the context of an unambiguous
149

Id. at 1227.
Id.
151
See generally Rosen v. Montgomery County, 121 F.3d 154 (4th Cir.
1997); Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795 (5th Cir. 2000).
152
Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 213 (1998).
153
Id. at 210.
154
Id. at 211; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2009).
150
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statutory text that is irrelevant.”155 As the Court explained, “the fact
that a statute can be applied in situations not expressly anticipated
by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates
breadth.”156 The Court’s decision in Yeskey clearly paved the way
for a broader reading of Title II that supports the notion that the
ADA applies to law enforcement, including arrests.157
The Supreme Court has further considered the intersection of
disability and the criminal justice system in light of capital
punishment.158 In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court created a
categorical rule prohibiting the use of capital punishment for
individuals with intellectual disabilities.159Applying the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment160
in light of “evolving standards of decency,” the Supreme Court held
that the “Constitution places a substantive restriction on the State’s
power to take the life” of prisoners with intellectual disabilities.161
The Court’s opinion in Atkins was emblematic of an underlying shift
in public opinion favoring increased protections for people with
disabilities.162
Twelve years later, the Supreme Court in Hall v. Florida
affirmed the categorical bar created by Atkins and held a Florida
155
156

(1985)).
157

Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 211–12.
Id. at 212 (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499

See Rachel E. Brodin, Remedying a Particular Form of Discrimination:
Why Disabled Plaintiffs Can and Should Bring Claims for Police Misconduct
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 170–73
(2005).
158
See Atkins v. Virginia 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct.
1986 (2014).
159
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
160
See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
161
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405
(1986)).
162
See, e.g., Lyn Entzeroth, Putting the Mentally Retarded Criminal
Defendant to Death: Charting the Development of a National Consensus to
Exempt the Mentally Retarded from the Death Penalty, 52 ALA. L. REV. 911, 912
(2001); see also AM. ASS’N ON INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES,
Criminal
Justice
System,
https://aaidd.org/newspolicy/policy/position-statements/criminal-justice#.Vt4ogpODGkq (last visited
Sept. 16, 2016).
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statute that used a fixed IQ score as the measure of incapacity to be
unconstitutional.163 As the Court highlighted, “[i]ntellectual
disability is a condition, not a number.”164 The Court referenced
significant evolving policy rationales, including respect for human
dignity and increasing calls for social justice as a basis for their
decision.165
This Supreme Court jurisprudence affording persons with
disabilities increased protection in various sectors of the criminal
justice system highlights the absence of Supreme Court guidance
effectively bringing law enforcement within the scope of the ADA.
As former Supreme Court Justice and President of the American Bar
Association Lewis Powell, Jr. once said, “Equal justice under the
law is not merely a caption on the facade of the Supreme Court
building; it is perhaps the most inspiring ideal of our society. It is
one of the ends for which our entire legal system exists.”166 It is time
to make this aspiration a reality. Individuals with I/DD and mental
illness are entitled to more than mere piecemeal protection; they
require a robust set of protections that include extensive ADA
legislation and favorable Supreme Court jurisprudence.167
163

See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014) (“If, from test scores, a
prisoner is deemed to have an IQ above 70, all further exploration of intellectual
disability is foreclosed. This rigid rule, the Court now holds, creates an
unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability will be executed, and
thus is unconstitutional.”).
164
Id. at 2001.
165
The Supreme Court noted that, “[t]he Eighth Amendment is not fastened
to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened
by a humane justice.” Id. at 1992 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,
378 (1910)). Likewise, “[t]o enforce the Constitution’s protection of human
dignity, this Court looks to the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society. The Eighth Amendment’s protection of dignity
reflects the Nation we have been, the Nation we are, and the Nation we aspire to
be.” Id. Finally, in holding that no “legitimate penological purpose” exists when
executing a person with an intellectual disability the court opined, “to impose the
harshest of punishments on an intellectually disabled person violates his or her
inherent dignity as a human being.” Id.
166
Francis J. Larkin, The Legal Services Corporation Must be Saved, 34
JUDGES’ J. 1, 1 (Winter 1995).
167
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”); see also
Maas, supra note 38, at 217.
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C. Additional Policy Justifications

A 2013 joint report by the Treatment Advocacy Center (“TAC”)
and National Sheriffs’ Association highlighted a disturbing trend
that is not uncommon in today’s society: “at least half of the people
shot and killed by police each year in this country have mental health
problems.”168 As Chuck Wexler, Executive Director of the Police
Executive Research Forum, succinctly noted in the Washington
Post, “this is a national crisis . . . . We have to get American police
to rethink how they handle encounters with the mentally ill.”169 Any
attempt to remedy this problem must be grounded in the ADA’s
remedial provisions. As explained in Section I, Title II of the ADA
places an affirmative obligation on public entities, including law
enforcement agencies, to provide reasonable accommodations in
their services and practices when it is necessary to avoid
discrimination on the basis of disability.170
The Supreme Court has also played a large role in shaping and
interpreting the policy considerations characteristic of the ADA. In
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, the Supreme Court determined that
the ADA’s antidiscrimination provisions required placement of
people with mental disabilities in less restrictive community settings
rather than forced institutionalization.171 The Court held that:
Such action is in order when the State’s treatment
professionals have determined that community
placement is appropriate, the transfer from
institutional care to a less restrictive setting is not
opposed by the affected individual, and the
placement can be reasonably accommodated, taking

168
TREATMENT AND ADVOCACY CTR. & NAT’L SHERIFFS’ ASS’N,
JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDES BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS: WHAT IS THE ROLE
OF MENTAL ILLNESS? 3 (Sept. 2013) [hereinafter TAC JOINT REPORT],
http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/2013-justifiablehomicides.pdf. The Washington Post has this number at approximately a quarter.
See Lowery et al., supra note 5.
169
See Lowery et al., supra note 5.
170
See supra Part I.
171
See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999).
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into account the resources available to the State and
the needs of others with mental disabilities.172
Olmstead concerned two women with mental health illnesses
and developmental disabilities who remained institutionalized
despite their psychiatrists determining that their needs could be
appropriately met in a more integrated community setting.173 The
Supreme Court held that this isolation was a violation of Title II of
the ADA.174 In reaching this conclusion, the Court highlighted two
important justifications. First, “institutional placement of persons
who can handle and benefit from community settings perpetuates
unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable or
unworthy of participating in community life.”175 Second,
“confinement in an institution severely diminishes the everyday life
activities of individuals.”176 Although Olmstead decided a fairly
narrow issue concerning institutionalization, the underlying
rationale of promoting community integration should not be limited
to these instances.
As the DOJ has indicated, the goal of Title II’s so-called
integration mandate177 is “to provide individuals with disabilities
opportunities to live their lives like individuals without
disabilities.”178 Applying this mandate to the law enforcement
context, it is evident that police must provide more proactive
reasonable accommodations during a search or seizure to ensure that
persons with disabilities are afforded the same protections as
persons without. For example, people without disabilities are
typically able to identify themselves to the police and provide
172

Id.
Id. at 593.
174
Id. at 597 (“Unjustified isolation . . . is properly regarded as
discrimination based on disability.”).
175
Id. at 600.
176
Id. at 601.
177
See 28 C.F.R § 35.130(d) (2011) (“A public entity shall administer
services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the
needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.”).
178
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Statement of the Department of Justice on
Enforcement of the Integration Mandate of Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities
Act
and
Olmstead
v.
L.C.,
http://www.ada.gov/olmstead/q&a_olmstead.htm (last updated June 22, 2011).
173
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reasonable explanations for their actions, if necessary. However this
communication might not be readily available, or even possible, for
people with disabilities.179
Although the Olmstead de-institutionalization mandate was
viewed as a humane way of caring for mental illness in communitybased settings, an unintended consequence of this was the increased
criminalization of mental illness due to the lack of adequate
treatment alternatives.180 Too often there is a lack of resources
devoted to mental health treatment and, as a result, many individuals
with mental health issues or disabilities are funneled through the
criminal justice system.181 A 2002 report published by the National
Council on Disability stated:
For adults, neglect or poor treatment by the mental
health system increases the likelihood an adult with
mental illness will encounter other more coercive
and crisis-oriented systems, like law enforcement,
corrections, institutionalization and emergency
rooms. Absent the services and supports they need in
the community, people with serious mental illness
become caught up in the criminal justice system.
Ironically, these individuals are often discharged
from jails and prisons into the community with little
or no planning for treatment. Lacking treatment, their
lives become a revolving door of arrest,
incarceration, release and rearrest.182
179

See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 33, § II.
See DARRELL STEINBERG ET AL., STAN. L. SCH. THREE STRIKES PROJECT,
WHEN DID PRISONS BECOME ACCEPTABLE MENTAL HEALTHCARE Facilities 1
(Feb. 19, 2015), http://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/childpage/632655/doc/slspublic/Report_v12.pdf (“Although deinstitutionalization was
originally understood as a humane way to offer more suitable services to the
mentally ill in community-based settings, some politicians seized upon it as a way
to save money by shutting down institutions without providing any meaningful
treatment alternatives. This callousness has created a one-way road to prison for
massive numbers of impaired individuals and the inhumane warehousing of
thousands of mentally ill people.”).
181
See id. at 1–2; TAC JOINT REPORT, supra note 168, at 4, 7–8.
182
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, THE WELL BEING OF OUR NATION: AN
INTER-GENERATIONAL VISION OF EFFECTIVE MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES AND
SUPPORTS
37
(Sept.
16,
2002),
180
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This is one reason why reasonable accommodations are
necessary throughout the criminal justice system; they can serve as
another line of defense against the criminalization of mental
illnesses and I/DD. Rather than strict punitive responses such as
incarceration, a wide range of reasonable accommodations—from
arranging proper mental health treatment to coordinating benefits,
among others—can serve as less restrictive alternatives to
incarceration and lessen the possibility of an unnecessary violent
police intrusion.183
Nevertheless, there are legitimate countervailing policy
considerations that cut against the obligation to provide reasonable
accommodations for persons with mental health issues and/or I/DD
in the law enforcement context. The National League of Cities
submitted an amicus brief in Sheehan that argued that the ADA
should not apply to arrests in emergency situations.184 Chief among
their reasons were the safety concerns that arise if an officer is
required to delay taking action to assess what, if any, reasonable
accommodations are appropriate for a given suspect.185 The brief
also addressed the inherent inequity of requiring police officers to
exercise their judgment in confronting people with mental illnesses
or developmental disabilities when that particular job is better suited
to mental health professionals.186 This is especially true because

https://www.ncd.gov/rawmedia_repository/0775e9da_e4b3_468f_837b_6c7cf82
b03a2.pdf.
183
See id. at 46–48.
184
See Brief of Amici Curiae Nat’l League of Cities, U.S. Conference Of
Mayors, Nat’l Ass’n of Counties, Int’l City/County Mgmt. Ass’n, League of
California Cities, California State Ass’n of Counties, Washington State Ass’n of
Mun. Attorneys, and Ass’n of Washington Cities as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 21, City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765
(2015) (No. 13-1412), 2015 WL 328831.
185
See id. at 21–23.
186
Id. at 31; TAC JOINT REPORT, supra note 168, at 8 (“The transfer of
responsibility for mentally ill persons from mental health professionals to law
enforcement officers is patently illogical. Law enforcement officers self-select
and are trained to do traditional police work. If they had wanted to become mental
health professionals, they would have done so. To take people trained in law
enforcement and use them as mental health professionals is a grossly
inappropriate use of their skills . . . Law enforcement agencies are thus penalized
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“[p]olice officers commonly determine that a suspect has a mental
illness only when they arrive on the scene, and usually have limited
information about the suspect’s mental illness and current state of
deterioration.”187
But, this is exactly why only reasonable accommodations are
necessary. It is important to not only protect the well-being of
individuals with disabilities but also law enforcement officers.188
Ultimately, there must be a workable dynamic that protects the
rights and safety of individuals with I/DD, protects police officers’
safety, and simultaneously addresses the inherent disconnect
between the traditional obligations of officers and the practical
mental health treatment roles they are routinely forced into.
V. COMPREHENSIVE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS MUST
PROVIDE SECURITY FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES
A. The Supreme Court Should Adopt a Clear, Uniform
Standard
Reflecting the majority of the circuit courts’ opinions that the
ADA does apply to arrests,189 and consistent with existing
jurisprudence favoring increased protections for persons with
mental illness and disability,190 if and when the Supreme Court is
presented this issue again, the Court should hold that law
enforcement agencies have an affirmative obligation to provide
individually tailored reasonable accommodations to suspects with
I/DD and other mental health illnesses in order to effectuate the

for not doing a better job on something they are neither trained nor equipped to
do.”).
187
Brief as Amici Curiae, supra note 184, at 31.
188
See TAC JOINT REPORT, supra note 168, at 9 (“The transfer of
responsibility for individuals with serious mental illnesses from mental health
professionals to law enforcement officers is incompatible with good psychiatric
care. The current situation is victimizing both the patients and the law
enforcement officers.”).
189
See supra Part III.
190
See supra Section IV.B.
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ADA’s remedial purpose.191 There cannot be a one-size-fits-all
approach.192 Beyond merely recognizing this duty, the Supreme
Court should adopt a bright line rule that individuals with I/DD and
mental illnesses are entitled to presumptive reasonable
accommodations when subject to an arrest, and that law
enforcement agencies have the burden of rebutting this presumption
under certain, limited circumstances.193 Some of these possible
exceptions are provided in the ADA administrative regulations,194
191

Noting that courts “do not sit or act in a social vacuum,” Justice Marshall
recognized the role the judiciary should play in promoting equality in his dissent
in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 466 (1985). Marshall emphasized that
[H]istory makes clear that constitutional principles of equality,
like constitutional principles of liberty, property, and due
process, evolve over time . . . . Shifting cultural, political, and
social patterns at times come to make past practices appear
inconsistent with fundamental principles upon which American
society rests, an inconsistency legally cognizable under the
Equal Protection Clause. It is natural that evolving standards of
equality come to be embodied in legislation. When that occurs,
courts should look to the facts of such change as a source of
guidance on evolving principles of equality.
Id.
192
See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITYWIDE ADMIN. SERVS., REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATIONS
PROCEDURAL
GUIDELINES
1
(2015),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcas/downloads/pdf/misc/eeo_reasonableaccommodati
on.pdf (“There is no one-size-fits-all formula for deciding when to grant a
reasonable accommodation. Rather, the reasonable accommodation process must
be flexible, interactive, and individualized with meaningful, cooperative and
timely communication between the individual requesting the accommodation and
the agency.”).
193
Additionally, in order to truly satisfy the remedial purposes of the ADA,
there must be a more functional analysis of whether reasonable accommodations
are necessary to avoid discrimination rather than a categorical specific request
requirement as some courts have required. See, e.g., Rylee v. Chapman, 316 F.
App’x 901, 906 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Gaston v. Bellingrath Gardens & Home,
Inc., 167 F. 3d 1361, 1363 (11th Cir. 1999)); see also Maas, supra note 38, at 222
(“The specific request requirement fails to protect fairly and adequately persons
with disabilities during interactions with law enforcement.”).
194
See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2011) (providing a “fundamental
alteration” defense); see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.139(a) (2012) (providing a direct
threat exception).
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and many lower courts have already recognized a possible public
safety exception.195
The Supreme Court should hold that the determination of both
reasonable accommodations and exigency during an arrest should
be considered using a totality of the circumstances approach.196
Traditionally, exigent circumstances and proper use of force is
determined with significant deference to an officer’s on-the-scene
decision making.197 This traditional analysis is too narrow,
however.198 This proposed approach would broaden the scope of
police encounters to include analysis of what, if any, reasonable
accommodations were provided pre-arrest, and whether police
presence or misconduct incited the need for invoking the exigency
exception.199
An application of this analysis to the facts of Sheehan
demonstrates that the responding officers failed to accommodate
Sheehan or defuse the situation.200 The officers were obviously
aware of Sheehan’s disability as they responded to a call to
temporarily seize Sheehan and take her for psychiatric evaluation
195

See supra Part III.
See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (“The proper
application of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness determination “requires
careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including
the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat
to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest by flight.”).
197
As the Supreme Court held in Graham v. Connor, “[t]he reasonableness
of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable
officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id.
Furthermore, “[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the
fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount
of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 396–97.
198
See Avery, supra note 147, at 331 (“The notion . . . that officers are always
required to make ‘split-second’ decisions regarding the use of force is a myth.”).
199
See generally id. at 331–32.
200
Nor were other possible alternatives considered. Sandra Allen identified
some of these alternatives, for example: “[p]ut your weapon away. Lower your
voice. Don’t expect the person in psychiatric crisis to react rationally or
nonviolently. Secure the scene but wait for backup before moving in. Seek the
assistance of mental health professionals. Most importantly: Buy yourself time.”
Allen, supra note 10.
196
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and treatment.201 Thus, there was no issue of whether they had to
second guess themselves or hesitate in deciding whether reasonable
accommodations were necessary for this specific situation. Instead,
if following the presumptive accommodation standard introduced
above, they would have been required to provide reasonable
accommodations and employ less confrontational tactics to achieve
their purpose. Sheehan did not expect to be confronted by the police
that day; the entire situation arose out of a desire to help Sheehan
receive proper evaluation and treatment, not out of the need to arrest
an armed and dangerous individual.202 This approach allocates
responsibility by examining relevant police conduct and strategic
decisions, the conduct of the victim, as well as a more functional
consideration of whether the situation could have been mitigated or
avoided entirely by providing reasonable accommodations.203
B. Examples of Preemptive Reasonable Accommodations
that Should be Universally Implemented
1. Police Training
First and foremost, because police officers are often the first
responders to calls involving individuals with I/DD,204 more
thorough and tailored police training must be implemented so
officers are able to respond to these situations in an appropriately
humane and accommodating manner. Unfortunately, implementing
appropriate training seems to be easier said than done. The
Washington Post report highlighted a troublesome, yet wholly
avoidable problem: insufficient and ineffective police training.205
201

Sheehan v. City and County of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th
Cir. 2014), rev’d in part, cert dismissed in part, (135 S. Ct. 1765) (2015).
202
See Flatow, supra note 137 (“The case started like too many others
involving mentally ill individuals and the police: a call to police for help.”).
203
As the officers in Sheehan acknowledged, they did not even consider
whether Sheehan’s mental illness should be accommodated before forcing the
second entry. Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1219.
204
See, e.g., Santos & Goode, supra note 2.
205
Unfortunately this seems to be a common problem. As the Washington
Post report found, “[m]ore than half the killings involved police agencies that have
not provided their officers with state-of-the-art training to deal with the mentally

588

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

This is a particular problem because, generally speaking, police
officers are in a position to choose how to respond in a given
situation,206 and there are often numerous de-escalation tactics
police can employ to defuse situations.207 Without the continued
focus on training police officers, persons with disabilities and
mental illness will remain at an increased risk of unnecessarily and
unjustly becoming entangled with the criminal justice system. More
dynamic training efforts are necessary to help officers understand,
identify, and empathize with these individuals.
Law enforcement agencies should not be expected, however, to
implement meaningful changes on their own. Impactful and
sustainable training for confronting people with disabilities can only
be effectively accomplished by forging partnerships between law
enforcement and mental health professionals.208 For instance, the
Criminal Justice and Mental Health Consensus Project calls for
community partnerships to help create different service options as
alternatives to incarceration.209 These partnerships function with the
dual goals of supporting the legitimate public safety concerns that
law enforcement is tasked with protecting and allowing for the
necessary care of people with disabilities.210 This holistic method
allows community partners to proactively provide reasonable
accommodations for people with disabilities, such as developing
ill. And in many cases, officers responded with tactics that quickly made a volatile
situation even more dangerous.” Lowery et al., supra note 5; see also Avery,
supra note 147, at 296 (“Police training materials provide a clear and simple
approach to handling emotionally disturbed people that can be taught to
officers . . . . Yet, in many cases involving police encounters with emotionally
disturbed people, the reality of police training . . . is either entirely ignored or
significantly undervalued.”).
206
INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, BUILDING SAFER COMMUNITIES:
IMPROVING POLICE RESPONSE TO PERSONS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 17 (June 2010)
[hereinafter
IACP
RECOMMENDATIONS],
http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/ImprovingPoliceResponsetoPersonsWith
MentalIllnessSummit.pdf.
207
See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE/MENTAL HEALTH
CONSENSUS
PROJECT
42
(June
2002),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/197103.pdf.
208
Id. at 45.
209
Id. at 9.
210
Id.
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more considerate and less aggressive police methods, and focusing
on treatment programs as alternatives to arrest and incarceration.211
Community partnerships can further solidify police training in
regards to crisis intervention and appropriate responses to persons
with mental illness.212
One of the most progressive programs designed with these goals
in mind is the “Memphis Model,” or more formally, Crisis
Intervention Training (“CIT”).213 The CIT program is primarily
used to arm first responders, specifically law enforcement officers,
with the skills and supports necessary to help individuals with
disabilities and mental illnesses avoid arrest and incarceration where
appropriate.214 Many of the central features of these programs are
used to educate officers about mental health and the potential efforts
that can be made to decrease the likelihood of a violent confrontation
or unnecessary arrest.215 The success of the CIT program in
Memphis216 offers hope that increased, or at least more tailored,
211

See, e.g., IACP RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 206, at 14–16.
Id. at 17–19.
213
See Memphis Model, CIT INT’L, http://www.citinternational.org/trainingoverview/163-memphis-model.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2016); see also IACP
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 206, at 9 (describing Crisis Intervention Training
as a collaborative effort emphasizing community-based treatment programs
instead of arrest by “de-escalating crisis situations, decreasing the use of force by
officers and increasing mental health consumers’ access to community treatment
options”); Allen, supra note 10 (“De-escalation tactics, often called the Memphis
Model or Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) training, are lauded by experts as being
the best practices police can employ . . . .”).
214
See Memphis Model, supra note 213.
215
See IACP RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 206, at 9 (“In jurisdictions that
have implemented CIT, its central feature is a 40-hour long training program for
law enforcement officers that includes information on how to recognize the
behavioral characteristics of persons with mental illness; local mental health
system characteristics; and methods of de-escalating crisis situations.”). For
example, as Lieutenant Mario Molina of the San Francisco Police Department has
stated, “[m]ost police officer-involved shootings happen within 90 seconds to two
minutes of arrival of officers at the scene . . . . Our officers need to slow down.
Create that distance, create that time, that might help to resolve the situation
without using force.” Allen, supra note 10.
216
See
generally
CIT:
Facts
and
Benefits,
CIT INT’L,
http://www.citinternational.org/cit-overview/131-cit-facts-and-benefits.html (last
visited Sept. 16, 2016).
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training can help reduce the number of unnecessary arrests and
violent confrontations between the police and persons with
disabilities. In fact, many communities around the country have
already organized successful CIT programs.217 These programs
provide a strong model for implementing comprehensive police
training nationwide.
Former judge and independent Police Auditor for the City of San
Jose, LaDoris Hazzard Cordell has championed similarly
progressive policies to combat police misconduct.218 Although she
considers police misconduct from the purview of racial
discrimination, her proposed reforms should be construed more
broadly to address discrimination on the basis of disability and
mental illness. Arguing for greater reform than merely more
intensive training, she proposes different strategies that can be
implemented to mitigate police misconduct.219 First, she argues for
broadening the definition and scope of “reasonable use of force” to
consider the totality of the circumstances in a police encounter.220
Hazzard further contends that there must be independent civilian
oversight of police conduct because, as she notes, such oversight
“holds police officers accountable to the public by providing
independent review of complaints of police misconduct, instead of
relying solely upon internal investigations in which the police
investigate themselves.”221 These reforms highlight significant
policy considerations: deterring police misconduct,222 promoting
217

See
generally
CIT
INTERACTIVE
MAP,
http://cit.memphis.edu/citmap/index.php (last visited Sept. 16, 2016); see, e.g.,
COMMUNITIES FOR CRISIS INTERVENTION TEAMS IN NYC, http://www.ccitnyc.org
(last visited Sept. 16, 2016).
218
See generally LaDoris Hazzard Cordell, Policing the Police, SLATE (Aug.
15,
2014,
4:56
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/08/we_kno
w_how_to_decrease_police_violence_like_what_we_ve_seen_after_the_michae
l.single.html.
219
Id.
220
Id.
221
Id.
222
This justification mirrors the purpose of the Fourth Amendment’s
exclusionary rule as a “deterrent safeguard.” As the Supreme Court affirmed in
Mapp v. Ohio, “the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter – to compel respect
for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way – by removing
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more tailored training in regards to disabilities, and holding the
police accountable for their actions.
2. Judicial Reform
There must also be continued judicial training and more
accommodating judicial processes to avoid the pitfalls of
unnecessary incarceration and repeated involvement with the
criminal justice system. The good news is that many jurisdictions,
including New York, have recognized this and have implemented
specialized “problem-solving” courts, including mental health
courts.223 In an attempt to provide a more holistic approach to the
judicial process, New York’s problem-solving courts “look to the
underlying issues that bring people into the court system, employ
innovative approaches to address those issues, and seek to simplify
the court process for litigants.”224 These courts emphasize a broad
range of goals tying together law enforcement, judicial operations,
and individual concerns.225 In furthering these goals, the specialized
mental health courts are, at least in theory, especially cognizant of
improving the quality of life for people with disabilities, and finding
less restrictive alternatives to incarceration.226
the incentive to disregard it.” Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (citing
Elkins v. U.S., 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
223
See,
e.g.,
Problem
Solving
Courts
Overview,
https://www.nycourts.gov/COURTS/problem_solving/index.shtml (last visited
Sept. 16, 2016).
224
Id.
225
Virtually all of New York’s Mental Health Courts share the ultimate goals
of improving public safety: reducing the frequency of arrests and/or the amount
of time that criminal offenders are actually incarcerated; using limited judicial
resources more effectively by limiting contacts between law enforcement and
people with disabilities; improving courts’ ability to identify and assess people
with disabilities and obtaining the necessary treatment, thereby reducing further
exposure to law enforcement; and, improving coordination between the mental
health and criminal justice systems. See generally Mental Health Courts: Mission
and
Goals,
NYCOURTS.GOV,
https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/problem_solving/mh/mission_goals.shtml (last
visited Sept. 16, 2016).
226
“Instead of incarcerating mentally ill offenders, Mental Health Courts can
help to connect them to community-based treatment and support services that
encourage recovery.” Id.
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3. Identifying Disability in the Law Enforcement
Context

Despite the widespread realization that there must be systemic
reform in the criminal justice system pertaining to individuals with
I/DD,227 all of the policies and accommodations mentioned above
are moot if officers cannot properly identify suspects with mental
disabilities and are forced to rely on their own judgments.228 In order
to achieve meaningful progress towards a workable solution, there
must be efforts to help individuals communicate that they have a
disability, and to help police identify individuals with I/DD or
mental health issues. This unfortunately is a much more complex
problem than identifying other immutable characteristics such as
race or gender. Disabilities may not be readily apparent; therefore,
officers may not be able to determine when accommodations are
necessary.229 The Disability Independence Group (“DIG”), a Florida
based nonprofit legal advocacy group focused on disability rights,
recognized this problem and developed a collective response.230
DIG has introduced a collaborative and progressive “wallet
card” program to help facilitate positive communication with law
enforcement and first responders, and to assist in self-

227

See, e.g., COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 207, at 2.
See, e.g., David M. Perry & Lawrence Carter-Long, How
Misunderstanding Disability Leads to Police Violence, ATLANTIC (May 6, 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/05/misunderstanding-disabilityleads-to-police-violence/361786/ (“Law enforcement officials expect and demand
compliance, but when they don’t recognize a person’s disability in the course of
an interaction, the consequences can be tragic. Misconceptions or assumptions
can lead to overreactions that culminate in unnecessary arrest, use of pepper spray,
or individuals being tasered.”).
229
See Brodin, supra note 157, at 160 n.23 (“The type of disability in an
individual case is often relevant to the question of whether the police officers were
aware of the plaintiff’s disability because individuals with mental and emotional
disabilities may be less likely to inform the officers of their disability, and the
disability itself may not be immediately apparent to the officer.”).
230
See
About
DIG,
DISABILITY
INDEPENDENCE
GROUP,
http://www.justdigit.org/about-dig/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2016).
228
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identification.231 This free program232 offers a personalized
identification card that “is designed to help [individuals with I/DD]
communicate with officers or first responders about their disability
and some of the challenges they face.”233 Further highlighting the
underlying rationale for this program, “[s]omeone who has a
cognitive issue could be portrayed as somebody who is not
following police commands, or might appear to be under the
influence of drugs or alcohol, when it is not the case. The wallet card
will help ease that communication and help officers understand
more.”234 Although this program is currently implemented at the
local level, this is an important first step for achieving national
progress towards recognizing the importance of accommodating
people with disabilities when searched or seized by law
enforcement.
Without more diverse and robust protections in the criminal
justice system, persons with I/DD and mental illness remain
vulnerable.235 As this review indicates, more accommodating
procedures can be implemented at every level of the criminal justice
system—from the street to the courtroom—to ensure that
individuals with mental illness and I/DD are not disproportionately
subjected to violent police use of force or unduly prejudiced by
shortcomings in the criminal justice system. The first step in this
reform must be to help officers identify disabilities and respond
accordingly, while simultaneously empowering individuals with
disabilities to identify themselves and assert their rights. But as these
recommendations suggest, meaningful progress towards repealing
the criminalization of mental illness and protecting against
231

See generally The Wallet Card Application, DISABILITY INDEPENDENCE
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(Jan.
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disproportionate police use of force against persons with disabilities
will only be accomplished through a concerted effort by criminal
justice, judicial, and community partners to create a comprehensive
plan for accommodating persons with mental illness and I/DD in
their encounters with law enforcement and throughout the criminal
justice system.
CONCLUSION
Individuals with I/DD and mental illness are disproportionately
represented in the criminal justice system, and too often police
encounters with these individuals end in needless violence.236
Although the ADA applies to law enforcement agencies,237 without
an affirmative Supreme Court interpretation, the issue of whether
and to what extent the ADA applies to arrests remains an unsettled
question.238 In order to overcome the harmful status quo reflecting
the disparate treatment of individuals with mental illness and
I/DD,239 the Supreme Court must acknowledge that police officers
have an affirmative duty to proactively accommodate these
individuals during a search or seizure in order to avoid
discrimination. The good news is that a number of advocacy and law
enforcement agencies have already recognized this pressing issue
and have taken affirmative steps to implement more accommodating
policies and practices. More can be done, however, to ensure that
individuals with I/DD and mental health issues are treated fairly in
the criminal justice system and are not needlessly subjected to
violent police use of force and unnecessary arrests. A
comprehensive accommodations scheme is necessary to safeguard
these individuals’ rights and to protect against further tragedies
similar to the one that befell Teresa Sheehan.
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